BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

Acknowledgements

 

 

 

Monica Rohde, the Center for Health, Environment and Justice’s Stop Dioxin Exposure Campaign Coordinator, deserves special thanks and recognition. Monica spent tireless hours collecting and compiling data and information on dioxin, politics, and the chemical industry.  She also dedicated numerous hours to the coordination, writing, editing, and preparation of this report.

 

Special thanks also go to Science Director, Stephen Lester and Research Associate, Ron Nicosia for their hours of reviewing, editing and fact checking.  Dioxin Campaign Intern Emma McCauley deserves special thanks her work in the development of this report as does Barbara Sullivan for the layout.  We’d also like to thank Patty Lovera for reviewing several drafts of this report.

 

We would like to thank Lisa Kleven and Celia Davis from the Data Center in Oakland, California for researching and collecting the data and articles, which provided the foundation of this report.  

 

 

 

Copies of this report is available from

 

 

Center For Health, Environment and Justice

P.O. Box 6806

Falls Church, VA 22040

703-237-2249

chej@chej.org

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

 

 

Preface

Executive Summary

 

Section 1. Chemical Industry Initiatives to Discredit and Stall the Release of the EPA’s Dioxin Reassessment

 

*   Conflict of Interest: How the Chemical Industry Stacks Scientific

Peer Review Panels

*   Public Participation: The Chemical Industry’s Attempt to Ram

Through a Policy that Would Squash Freedom of Speech

*   Bait and Switch: Science Advisory Board Report on November

      Meeting

*   Lawsuits: A Way to Conceal Information from the Public

*   Stall Tactics:  Delay is the Name of the Game

 

Section 2. Chemical Industry Efforts to Block Local Initiatives on Dioxin

 

Section 3. Chemical Industry Influence during the U.N. Treaty Negotiations on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)

 

*  The Chlorine Chemistry Council Takes the U.S. Delegation Hostage

*   The Chemical Industry Seeks to Eliminate Elimination 

 

Section 4. The Chemical Industry and Electoral Politics

 

References

 

Appendix A   Timeline of Events

Appendix B   What is Dioxin?

Appendix C   Chemical Industry Support for Bush and Whitman

 


.

PREFACE

 

 

 

Behind Closed Doors is the latest eye-opening and groundbreaking report from the Stop Dioxin Exposure Campaign.  The campaign is a network of hundreds of environmental justice groups, religious leaders, health care professionals, scientists and health impacted groups, representing thousands of people across the country. The campaign is coordinated by the Center for Health, Environment and Justice, in Falls Church, Virginia.

 

In 1991, grassroots activists from across the country fighting dioxin-polluting facilities came together in Chapel Hill, North Carolina to attend the 1st Citizen's Dioxin Conference.  The gathering was aimed at providing community groups the opportunity to hear leading scientists from around the world report on their research on the health effects of dioxin.  The 2nd Citizen's Dioxin Conference, held in 1994 near Times Beach, Missouri – a town evacuated in the early 1980s because of dioxin contamination – brought together community groups working to shut down or block dioxin polluting facilities such as incinerators, pulp and paper mills, and PVC manufacturing facilities.  Strategies to end dioxin exposure were discussed as part of this meeting.  A year later, at a roundtable meeting in Arlington, Virginia, community leaders came together to plan a nationwide grassroots campaign to stop dioxin exposure.  A key element of this campaign was to pressure the United States Environmental Protection Agency to finalize and release the reassessment of the health effects of dioxin that the agency had begun in 1991.

 

The Stop Dioxin Exposure Campaign was officially kicked off in 1995 with the release of Dying from Dioxin: A Citizen's Guide to Reclaiming Our Health and Rebuilding Democracy.  The first of half Dying from Dioxin describes how dioxin is destroying the health of the American people and is based largely on the EPA’s 1994 draft reassessment document on dioxin. The second half is devoted to organizing a campaign to reclaim our health by eliminating dioxin exposure. The ultimate goal of the campaign is to achieve a sustainable society in which there is no dioxin in our food or breast milk because there is no dioxin formation, discharge, or exposure.  To achieve this goal, the campaign is committed to:

 

  1. Halting all incineration, including medical waste incinerators; municipal waste incinerators; hazardous waste incinerators; military waste incinerators; sewage sludge incinerators; and hazardous waste burning in cement and aggregate kilns, boilers, and industrial furnaces;
  2. Exposing and challenging dioxin assaults on low-income communities and communities of color;
  3. Phasing out industrial uses of chlorine, including its use in pulp and paper manufacturing and in PVC plastics, and include provisions for affected workers;
  4. Identifying more clearly the various sources of dioxin;
  5. Determining the levels of dioxin in food and breast milk so that the progress of the campaign can be measured;
  6. Promoting safe, alternative jobs, products and technologies.

 

These goals were adopted at the 3rd Citizen's Dioxin Conference in 1996 in Baton Rogue, Louisiana and reaffirmed at the 4th Dioxin Conference in August, 2000 in Berkeley, California.

 

In November of 1999, the campaign released America's Choice: Children's Health or Corporate Profits.  This peer-reviewed report summarizes new scientific research on the toxic effects caused by or associated with dioxin exposure.  The report builds on the scientific data on health effects described  in the EPA's 1994 draft dioxin reassessment and includes studies published since the draft's release. In addition, America's Choice outlines specific policy initiatives that state and local governments can take to eliminate dioxin. The report is intended to inform the public and their representatives in government so appropriate action can be taken to safeguard the health of the American people.  Following the release of that report, public hearings were held in thirteen locations as a way of engaging elected officials in a dialogue for adopting policies that will protect the public's health.  

 

Throughout the 1990s, community groups have been successful in shutting down and blocking hundreds of municipal and medical waste incinerators. Communities have also been successful in introducing local and state policy initiatives that protect the public from dioxin exposure.  However, no matter how successful our efforts have been at a local and state level, we have been unable to move the federal government.  The primary reason for this is the chemical industry’s ability to block policies that would protect the public.  This is why we are now releasing Behind Closed Doors.  It is time for the American people to know how the chemical industry, like the tobacco industry, has been using its backdoor influence to preserve its profits at the expense of public health.

 

                                                                              –– Lois Marie Gibbs

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

The chemical industry does not want you to read this report.  Behind Closed Doors reveals evidence about how the chemical industry has methodically and strategically attempted to influence policy makers and conceal from and mislead the public about the health impacts of dioxin.  Just as with the tobacco industry, the public is demanding that the chemical industry be brought to justice. 

 

The primary players in this deception are the American Chemistry Council (ACC), formerly the Chemical Manufacturer's Association, and the Chlorine Chemistry Council (CCC).  The American Chemistry Council is a trade organization representing hundreds of chemical companies.  The Chlorine Chemistry Council, a division of the ACC, works on policy issues that affect the way its members conduct business. 

 

Under the leadership of Fredrick Webber, president of the American Chemistry Council and C.T. "Kip" Howlett, executive director of the Chlorine Chemistry Council, the CEOs of dioxin-generating companies and the lawyers and public relations firms that represent them have launched an all-out campaign to hide from the public the link between dioxin and cancer and other serious health disorders.  Public awareness of the danger dioxin poses to public health would significantly impact policies that regulate dioxin-generating companies.

 

At the center of the debate are two policy approaches: 1) dioxin elimination vs. dioxin control, and 2) precaution vs. risk management.   For any dioxin policy to have a chance at meaningful impact, it must have at its core a commitment to eliminating dioxin.  What is required are policies that prohibit the creation of dioxin in the first place, instead of the current practice of trying to control dioxin after it has been produced.  The chemical industry prefers the latter since it allows them to conduct business with little or no change.  There are safe alternative processes for disposing of wastes, making paper white, and producing plastics without chlorine that won’t cause economic hardships.

 

The second policy debate involves the precautionary principle: “When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically” (Wingspread, 1998). Growing evidence on the hazards of dioxin demands precautionary action to prevent further exposure, even though absolute proof of harm has not been established. We know enough to act.  However, the chemical industry would rather place the burden on individuals to convince regulators that a facility is unsafe or to prove that their health disorders are linked to dioxin.    

 

Every American has dioxin in their body.  According to the EPA, about ninety percent of the American public’s exposure results from ingestion of common foods, mostly dairy and meat products. Dairy cows and beef cattle absorb dioxin by eating contaminated feed crops. The crops become contaminated by airborne dioxins that settle onto soil, water, and plants.  Dioxin then accumulates in the grazing animals that eat these crops.  People ingest dioxin when they eat meat, dairy products, and eggs. Some exposure also results from eating dioxin-contaminated fish.  Dioxin gets into our food supply from emissions from garbage, medical and hazardous waste incinerators, the bleaching of paper, and the manufacture and disposal of chlorinated plastics and pesticides.  Dioxin can result in serious health problems including cancer, attention deficit disorder, learning disabilities, weakened immune system, infertility, birth defects, and endometriosis (CHEJ, 1999; USEPA, 2000). 

 

Despite the alarming information about the dangers of dioxin, the Chlorine Chemistry Council has launched an attack to gut any report or policy that would eliminate dioxin or adopt a precautionary approach.  One of the chemical industry's prime targets has been the U.S. EPA's dioxin reassessment, due out later this spring, which identifies the sources and describes the adverse health effects of dioxin exposure. The chemical industry does not want this report released for fear it will implicate them in a major public health crisis. 

 

Behind Closed Doors documents the Chlorine Chemistry Council's egregious attempts to manipulate the Science Advisory Board (SAB).  The SAB is a department within the EPA whose role is to provide scientific peer-review of agency documents. The SAB achieves this goal by forming committees of scientists representing a balance of viewpoints and backgrounds.  However, in the case of the dioxin reassessment document, industry-backed scientists have dominated the SAB review committees. In fact, research on the November, 2000 dioxin committee showed that a third of the committee members received funding from 91 dioxin-generating companies.

 

This report takes a look at other instances where the chemical industry has employed a variety of stall tactics to keep the report from being finalized and released.  In the chemical industry’s view, as long as the EPA's dioxin reassessment is in draft form, decision-makers cannot develop or enforce policies based on the scientific data contained in the report.  These stall tactics include efforts to push through last-minute Congressional riders to appropriations bills and filing lawsuits based on procedural grounds.

 

Behind Closed Doors also looks at attacks launched on policy initiatives that aim to ultimately eliminate dioxin.  From opposing local resolutions introduced by community groups to attempting to influence the language of an international treaty on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), the Chlorine Chemistry Council and the American Chemistry Council have used a heavy hand to influence decision-makers. Regardless of the industry's tactics, community groups working on local and state policy initiatives and  non governmental organizations working on international treaties have remained credible and successful. 

 

The chemical industry has also launched an aggressive campaign to get candidates elected who will go easy on emission limits and regulation enforcement. The question is what can we expect from the Bush/Cheney administration? When Bush ran for president, Fredrick Webber of the American Chemistry Council became one of his "pioneers," a group of business leaders committed to raising over $100,000 for his campaign. According to Newsweek, the ACC raised over $350,000 for Bush’s campaign, generosity directly related to Bush’s track record of doing the industry’s bidding.  Similarly, Webber himself and the chemical industry as a whole have strongly endorsed the new EPA Administrator Christine Whitman for her willingness to give industry a seat at the table when developing policy.  

 

As the examples in this report show, the chemical industry has access to government officials and influence on the policy making process that is not available to the rest of the public. When industry is able to set the terms of debate, impose its priorities, and manipulate the regulatory process, it is a threat both to public health and to democracy.  

 

Many believe that the tactics used by the Chlorine Chemistry Council and the American Chemistry Council have been irresponsible.  In the same way that communities called the tobacco industry to account during the 1990s, communities are now insisting that the chemical industry admit they have misled the public about the health effects of dioxin. Communities fighting to eliminate dioxin exposure are demanding to know what is going on behind closed doors.

 

 


SECTION 1

 

Chemical Industry Initiatives to Discredit and Stall the Release of the EPA's Dioxin Reassessment

 

 

 

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) completed its first health assessment of dioxin in 1985.  The EPA’s estimate in this report of the cancer risk to humans from dioxin exposure was by far the highest defined for any chemical by any government agency anywhere in the world.  Because this report provided the scientific basis for all risk assessments used by EPA programs to regulate dioxin emissions and discharges to the environment, the regulated industries immediately protested that this risk estimate was too high.

 

The paper and chlorine industries in particular pressured the agency to reconsider this risk estimate. The focus of their argument was on the method used by the agency to estimate the cancer risk.  These industries argued that there was a "threshold" of exposure to dioxin, below which there was no risk, and that dioxin was much less dangerous than defined by the EPA.  The EPA argued that there was no threshold and that its risk estimate was supported by scientific evidence.

 

As part of its efforts to convince the EPA of its position, the Chlorine Institute (later to become the Chlorine Chemistry Council) in 1990 convened a scientific conference on dioxin. Shortly afterwards, in 1991, EPA Administrator William Reilly announced that the agency would undertake a reassessment of the health effects of dioxin based on findings from this conference.  The industries felt confident that the agency would now find that there was a level of exposure to dioxin that does not pose any risks, forcing the agency to recalculate its cancer-risk estimate.

 

Instead, scientists found new evidence that there was no threshold for some of dioxin's effects and that dioxin acted like a hormone, disrupting many systems in the body.  These and related findings supported the agency's original risk estimates and provided the scientific basis for the EPA's draft reassessment report, which was released in 1994. In this report, the EPA again concluded that dioxin poses a serious cancer risk and that the average American had a level of dioxin in their body that could cause adverse health effects (USEPA, 1994).

 

 

This draft prompted dioxin-generating companies to launch an aggressive campaign to stall the release of the report. This attack began with a peer review report led by industry scientists who rejected several chapters in the draft document, forcing the agency to rewrite them and delaying the process of finalizing the report (SAB, 1995). While this draft report was being rewritten, local and state agencies hesitated to take action on dioxin exposure situations, claiming that there was no clear guidance on the risks dioxin posed.  This led to a six-year delay during which people continued to be exposed to dioxin while government reevaluated its risk estimates and corporations operated as usual.

 

Finally, in June, 2000, the EPA released a revision of the 1994 reassessment report.  Much to the chemical industry’s dismay, the EPA found even stronger links between exposure to dioxin and adverse impacts on human health.  One of the EPA’s key findings was that the risk of getting cancer from dioxin exposure was ten times higher than reported in 1994 (USEPA, 2000). 

 

The strengthening of this link between dioxin exposure and cancer threatens the chemical industry's way of doing business.  Since June, the industry has intensified its efforts still further to challenge and discredit the scientific findings in the report and to further stall its release. One of its primary goals is to block policies that are aimed at eliminating dioxin and dioxin sources.

 

Yet, while the chemical industry has repeatedly challenged the EPA's conclusions, it has failed to raise doubts about the science behind the agency's conclusions.  The EPA has carefully laid out its arguments and supported them with credible scientific evidence.

 

 

 

Conflict of Interest: How the Chemical Industry Stacks Scientific Peer Review Panels

 

 

The EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB) dioxin review subcommittee met November 1 and 2, 2000, to review the EPA's dioxin reassessment. This meeting was one of the last steps in the review process before the EPA was to release the final document. Members of the SAB are presumed to be neutral scientific experts whose role is to review documents solely on their scientific merits.  The committee’s charge is to judge the validity of the conclusions drawn – not address their implications for policy.

Since the SAB contributes to the decision-making process of the agency by evaluating the technical basis for the EPA’s rules and regulations, SAB members and consultants are subject to U.S. government Conflict of Interest (COI) regulations.  These statutes and regulations are "aimed at preventing

individuals from (knowingly or unknowingly) bringing inappropriate influence to bear on Agency decisions which might affect the financial interests of those individuals, their family members and/or the organizations which employ them" (SAB, 1996).

 

According to the SAB Guidelines for Public Disclosure, SAB members and consultants are required to reveal:

 

1. Research conducted on the matter;

2. Previous pronouncements made on the matter;

3. Interests of the employer in the matter;

4. Any other financial interests they might have in the matter (e.g.,

    investments that might be directly affected by the matter);

5. Other links (e.g., research grants from parties – including the EPA –         

    that would be affected by the matter).

 

 

The Chemical Industry Acts

 

At the SAB meeting on November 1 and 2 in Washington, DC, none of the panel members' disclosure statements included the above information – despite the fact that members of this panel were strongly tied to dioxin-generating companies. Research on the SAB subcommittee prior to the meeting showed that a third of the committee members – Stephen Brown, Kenny Crump, John Graham, William Greenlee, Genevieve Matanoski, and Dennis Paustenbach – had received funding from ninety-one dioxin-polluting corporations (CHEJ, 2000).

 

For example, panel member Dennis Paustenbach is the vice president of Exponent, an engineering and scientific consulting firm.  Exponent prepared comments on the latest draft of the dioxin reassessment on behalf of Chemical Land Holdings, Inc. and Occidental Chemical Corporation.  The document essentially repeats the chemical industry's arguments on the link between dioxin and cancer and other adverse health effects. These comments were sent to the subcommittee well in advance of the November review meeting (CLH, 2000, 2000a).  However, when reading his conflict of interest statement, Paustenbach failed to mention Exponent’s actions.

 

 

 

Another panel member, John Graham, Director of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, has a long history of working for the chemical industry.  Graham, who is not a scientist, but an economist concerned with cost-benefit analysis, was interviewed on National Public Radio when the EPA released its latest draft reassessment in June, 2000.  When asked about the EPA's characterization that dioxin causes cancer in 1 in 100 people, Graham trivialized the matter by saying that the chances of getting cancer from dioxin and getting killed in a car crash were both 1 in 100, which put dioxin "on par with other common risks" (NPR, 2000).  During the SAB meeting, Graham again attempted to trivialize the seriousness of exposure to dioxin by stating that although dioxin does cause cancer in animals, it is also a "likely aniticarcinogen," i.e., there may be some positive effects from dioxin exposure.  Because of the adverse noncancerous health effects observed in people exposed to dioxin, several panel members had difficulty accepting that Graham was serious in raising this issue.  One panel member with expertise in developmental effects in children was incredulous at the suggestion that anyone, even the most fanatic proponent of this issue, would give dioxin to children to reduce their chances of getting cancer.  From a scientific point of view, this effect was seen only in a single animal study that is more than twenty years old and has not been repeated in other large studies of animals, raising question about the verifiability of this effect. Graham's record shows that he has been an outspoken opponent of the link between dioxin and cancer and that the arguments he uses are similar to those that dioxin-producing companies have used throughout the dioxin reassessment process.

 

(John Graham is currently the leading candidate to head EPA's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.  Housed at the Office of Management and Budget, this office has the power to gut any and all environmental regulations.)

 

Two of the committee members, Chairman Morton Lippmann, Professor at the New York University Medical Center and Genevieve Matanowski, Professor of Epidemiology at Johns Hopkins University were involved in a 1990 controversy over their failure to disclose ties to a tobacco industry-funded think tank while serving on an EPA panel reviewing the health effects of secondhand smoke (Weisskopf, 1990).  As he did during a 1995 SAB dioxin review meeting, Lippmann publicly voiced his skepticism about the EPA's characterization of the cancer risks of dioxin.  As chair at the November meeting, Lippmann had a special obligation not to allow his individual views to influence his actions on the committee.  He not only failed to serve as an impartial chair but attempted to use his position to manipulate the process.

 

 

 

As the meeting drew to a close and it became clear that the SAB wasn't able to challenge the EPA’s reassessment on its scientific merits, Lippmann initiated a conversation about policy issues that were not part of the agenda, and, more importantly, were clearly beyond the charge of the committee.  Lippmann challenged the EPA's right to classify dioxin as a human carcinogen, claiming that "the committee" was uncomfortable telling the public the results because "he" simply did not believe the results of the risk assessment. 

 

However, it quickly became clear that most committee members did not share his view.  Although a number of panel members repeatedly brought up industry-generated arguments intended to discredit the report’s scientific findings and stall the subcommittee's approval of the report, they were unsuccessful. Despite his views, Lippmann was compelled to announce that the process of releasing the report would move forward.

 

The Public Acts

 

Thirty-five community leaders from around the country attended the November dioxin review meeting.  They held a silent protest in the hall outside the meeting room.  Inside, as each member was asked to disclose conflicts of interest, community leaders held up lap-signs that listed the corporations with an interest in dioxin that the committee member had received funding from.  These community leaders later presented testimony on the need to finish the dioxin reassessment and release the report.  While these actions were within the parameters of accepted public participation, the chemical industry was clearly upset by them and determined to do something about it.

 

The EPA Responds

 

Following the meeting, several public participants wrote to Don Barnes, the Staff Director for the Science Advisory Board, expressing concerns regarding conflicts of interest (CHEJ, 2000a).  Barnes met with these participants to discuss the issue further.   Barnes gave both verbal and written assurances that the SAB would look into their concerns (SAB, 2000a). Because Barnes had not attended the November meeting, he wanted to wait until the transcript came out before he made any substantive comments. (The Science Advisory Board posted a transcript of the meeting on its web site in March, 2001, but this transcript did not include any discussion of the conflict of interest statements.)

 

 

 

 

Public Participation: The Chemical Industry's Attempt to Ram Through a Policy that Would Squash Freedom of Speech

 

 

The Chemical Industry Acts

 

On November 17, 2000, Kip Howlett, Executive Director of the Chlorine Chemistry Council (CCC) wrote a letter to Don Barnes expressing his disappointment at the way the SAB meeting was conducted and in the outcome.  He stated that the SAB meeting was a "shockingly low point in the history of SAB peer review deliberations."   He advocated that the SAB Executive Committee “conduct an immediate review of the process irregularities that occurred during the Nov. 1-2 meeting and institute procedural safeguards to ensure that future SAB meetings are conducted in an atmosphere free from intimidation."  He also argued that  "A new SAB subcommittee should be assembled to review the entire EPA dioxin reassessment, and sufficient time should be allotted so that a meaningful robust peer review can be conducted" (CCC, 2000).

 

This request for time to review the entire dioxin report is still another attempt to stall the release of the report.  The long delay in completing the latest draft of the report is largely due to repeated efforts by this and other dioxin-producing companies to delay the release of the report.  Having successfully stalled the release of the report, these companies are now arguing that too much time has passed and now the entire report needs to be reviewed again.

 

The EPA Responds

 

After speaking to panel members about whether they felt intimidated by the public participation at the meeting, Don Barnes sent a response to Howlett (SAB, 2000).  In his letter, dated November 20th, Barnes stated:

 

"To date, none of the Members have reported being 'intimidated' in the sense that it materially affected their deliberations.  Several felt 'uncomfortable'; others reported no reaction at all; and still others observed that they had experienced considerably greater disruption and harassment at other public meetings in which they had participated.

 

 

 

 

"At this stage of the inquiry, I conclude that the unusual (for SAB meetings), problematic behavior of some members of the audience was more contained and civil than it was disruptive and raucous, and that it did not materially affect the operations of this particular SAB review any more than public participation might affect other SAB reviews."

 

The Chemical Industry Responds

 

This response was not good enough for Kip Howlett. He demanded action and arranged a meeting with Don Barnes to further discuss the issue of public participation.  The Chlorine Chemistry Council (CCC) made specific recommendations for limiting public participation and advocated having uniformed officers present to enforce the new policies. The CCC also recommended holding meetings in federal buildings as a way of controlling the public outside of and inside the meeting.

 

The EPA Responds

 

According to Don Barnes, the meeting with Howlett was "very productive."  Based on this single meeting with an industry lobby group, the SAB staff developed a draft policy for controlling “audience behaviors,” shown in the table on the next page.  This proposed policy was offered for adoption at the next meeting of the Executive Committee of the SAB without input from all interested parties, a potential violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

 

The Public Responds

 

Outraged, members of the Stop Dioxin Exposure Campaign sent a letter to William Glaze, chairman of the SAB Executive Committee, about the proposed policy, raising legal and freedom of speech issues and urging him not to go forward with a knee-jerk policy put together to placate the CCC (Collier et. al., 2001).  They have also asked for a meeting with Chairman Glaze, which has not yet been granted.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

PROPOSED SAB POLICY

 SPECTRUM OF AUDIENCE BEHAVIORS AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSES

 

Distraction

Disturbance

Disruption

Modest display of signage

Abundance of active display of signage, particularly if directed at specific persons

Principal 1: Conscious action that is intended to or has the effect of limiting those authorized by the Chair to speak, be they Panel
members or public commenter;  e.g., noisy demonstrations or refusal to relinquish the microphone.

 

Modest amount of

photography; e.g., a few flash shots

Excess amount of photography; e.g., continual flash shots during deliberations, “in-your-face”
shots, etc.

Principal 2: Any action that threatens the physical well-being of Panelists, the public, or the facilities.

 

 

Modest active “street theater” outside of the immediate time and place of deliberations

Active “street theater” at the time and [p]lace of deliberations

 

 

 

 

Passive “street theater” during the deliberations; e.g., signs on the wall, audience members in costumes, etc.

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPROPRIATE ACTION

APPROPRIATE ACTION

APPROPRIATE ACTION

 

l.Nothing, just endure/enjoy it
OR
2. Brief statement about
“keeping in bounds”.

 

1. Admonishment by the DFO, appealing to a sense of fair play.

 OR
2. Temporarily suspend proceedings and discuss the matter.

 

 

1. Appeal to authorities to quell the action

OR

2. Declare the meeting adjourned—possibly reconvene in a more controlled conf call setting.

(Source: SAB, 2001)

 

The SAB Executive Committee discussed this proposed policy during their meeting February 5 and 6, 2001, in Washington DC.  Several of the committee members challenged the policy on both legal and freedom of speech grounds.  While the committee agreed not to formally adopt a new policy at this time, it has since decided to use the proposed policy as guidance for future meetings, including the upcoming SAB Executive Committee meeting scheduled for April 11 to review the SAB subcommittee's report on the dioxin reassessment.

 

Bait and Switch: Science Advisory Board Report on November Meeting

 

On March 12, 2001, the SAB released a draft of their report on the November, 2000 public meeting (SAB, 2001). This report is a flagrant example of the influence that dioxin-producing companies have had on the release of the final dioxin report.  This draft report reflects neither the basic conclusions nor the tenor of the November meeting.  There are several example of issues that had been resolved and of positions agreed upon in November that have been altered in the draft report to reflect the position of the dioxin-generating companies. The most egregious example is that the SAB draft document concludes that now the majority of the SAB panel do not agree that dioxin is a human carcinogen – a position in conflict with that in the November meeting.  It also concludes that the EPA should avoid calculating a cancer risk value – a violation of EPA policy for conducting risk assessment; in November, a majority of panel members at the meeting had supported doing the cancer-risk assessment. Moreover, the executive summary, along with a cover memo to Administrator Whitman, is heavily biased and does not fairly represent what is in the body of the report. The arguments in the executive summary are those that the dioxin-generating companies have made repeatedly since the release of the first draft reassessment document in 1994.  Since this draft report has just been released, there has been no public response to it yet.

 

Lawsuits: A Way to Conceal Information from the Public

 

 

In the past year, two lawsuits aimed at stopping important public health documents from reaching the public were filed. The same man – James Tozzi – representing two different entities, Multinational Business Services, Inc. (MBS) and the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE), filed both of these lawsuits.  Both suits were aimed at influencing the scientific support for the agency’s conclusions that dioxin is likely to be a human carcinogen and at stalling the report’s release to the public.

 

James Tozzi has a long history of working to prevent public health measures that would have an economic impact on big business.  During the Reagan administration, Tozzi served in the Office of Management and Budget, where he successfully spearheaded a campaign to "gut environmental regulations" (Rampton and Stauber, 2001). According to the Center for Media and

 

 

Democracy, Phillip Morris described Multinational Business Services, Inc. as its "primary contact on the EPA/ETS risk assessment" on secondhand cigarette smoke in the early 1990s (Rampton and Stauber, 2001).

 

The Chemical Industry's Acts

 

On January 17, 2000, Tozzi filed suit against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  (HHS), the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS),  and the National Toxicology Program (NTP) to prevent the NTP from placing dioxin in the "known to be a human carcinogen" category in its Ninth Report on Carcinogens.  Multinational Business Services, Inc. argued that if dioxin were listed as a known carcinogen it would create a food scare similar to the one that occurred over dioxin-tainted beef in Belgium in 1999.  Tozzi filed the suit in the U.S. District Court on behalf of a restaurant association, a Washington DC restaurant, a medical device manufacturer, and a law firm.

 

The